![]() ![]() ![]() We then go on to highlight some cases where there is a clear divergence between what is fictional in the work worlds and game worlds associated with particular videogames. We then draw attention to two important ontological distinctions and use these to diagnose the errors we think Tavinor is making. In fact, we shall argue that this is the case even if Walton’s controversial theory of depiction (which implies that all pictures are fictions) is rejected. To do this we first lay out Walton’s account of fiction, and then explain why it should be non-controversial that video-games belong to this category. We reject Tavinor’s claim and argue that videogames are perfectly standard Waltonian fictions and that the game/work world distinction is just as robust in the case of videogames as it is in other fictions. This would suggest that videogames are unlike traditional Waltonian fictions. In recent writings, Grant Tavinor has argued that although videogames are fictions, the Waltonian distinction between work worlds and game worlds breaks down, or is at least blurred, in the case of videogames. Work worlds are those fictional worlds associated with representational works or fictions, whereas game worlds are those associated with games in which those representations serve as props. But as part of his discussion of fictions Walton distinguishes between two kinds of fictional world, work worlds and game worlds. What are videogames? Are they fictions? Kendall Walton’s detailed account of fiction in Mimesis as Make-Believe is the most influential extant account of that category, and we argue that videogames count as fictions according to this view. ![]()
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